For more than two decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a major strategic threat for Israel, in particular because of its nuclear program. These are the two real enemy brothers in the region. Saudi Arabia even condemned the Israeli attack against “A brother country”, That is to say.
Tehran, who has long hidden the extent of his sensitive nuclear activities, remains today at the gates of the critical threshold for enrichment of uranium allowing rapid militarization. The IAEA, the UN agency in charge of monitoring Tehran’s activities, is still on site.
This night’s strikes fuel strong concerns both in Jerusalem and Washington, but it was especially Benyamin Netanyahu who, since his first mandates, made the “Neutralization of the Iranian threat” The heart of his security doctrine. Lately, Trump hoped to negotiate with Tehran, but Netanyahu, taking advantage of the country’s weakening, and wanting to cut the grass under the foot, today set foot in the dish to short-circuit the White House.
A nuclear threat more real than ever
Iran, since the 2000s, has developed a civilian nuclear capacity officially intended for energy production. However, the successive revelations of the IAEA, leaks from Western and Israeli intelligence services, and persistent ambiguities around underground installations like Fordo or Natanz, leave little doubt about Tehran’s desire to eventually have a nuclear weapons capacity.
For Israel, a nuclear Iran is a casus belli existential
The 2015 Vienna Agreement (JCPOA), negotiated with the great powers, had paused this process. But the unilateral removal of the United States in 2018 under Donald Trump had revived the Iranian nuclear dynamics. Today, according to several reports, Iran would have enough uranium enriched to make one or two warheads in a few months, even if the transition to the weapon remains hypothetical and politically risky for Tehran.
For Israel, a nuclear Iran is a casus belli existential. Iran is one of the only countries to radically challenge the legitimacy of the Hebrew state, while actively supporting, via its proxys (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi), hostile armed groups. An Iranian bomb would therefore not only be dissuasive: it could redefine the regional balance, weaken Israeli military superiority and open the door to a proliferation in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey). It is in this context that the offensive doctrine of the Israeli government is part of the Israeli government and, more specifically, Netanyahu’s obsession.
Netanyahu’s strategic obsession
Benyamin Netanyahu, several times Prime Minister of Israel since the 1990s, has built its international stature on a red line: preventing Iran from accessing the bomb. Sabotages of installations, targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, massive diplomatic pressures on the United States: everything has been tempted. Since October 7, and the war against Hamas-supported and armed by Iran-the risk of direct confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran has never been so high.
Leaks suggest that the Israeli staff regularly updates strike plans against Iranian nuclear installations, with or without American green light. Such an action – even preventive and targeted – could lead to a large -scale regional conflagration, involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Shiite militias. The front could become global.
The American factor
The attitude of the American president, Donald Trump, returned to power after the failure of Joe Biden’s second term, adds a new layer of unpredictability. If Trump had previously supported Israel without reservation, going so far as to recognize Jerusalem as capital, his personal relations with Netanyahu have seriously deteriorated since the last Israeli elections and the latter’s public criticism in 2021. Trump never digested what he perceived as a form of political betrayal.
In this unstable configuration, the game of alliances becomes blurred
Today, although overall favorable to a hard line against Iran, Trump could be less inclined to support Netanyahu in a unilateral military adventure, especially since he once again seeks to reach a good agreement rather than a bad war.
Pragmatic and focused on direct American interests, Trump could, in a reversal typical of his style, slow down an uncoordinated Israeli strike, especially if it judges it harmful to the American economy or likely to cause losses of regional troops. Conversely, if Iran launched a preventive or massive attack, Trump could react with disproportionate force, risking leading the United States in a total conflict. What everyone fears, Israeli as Iranians.
In this unstable configuration, the game of alliances becomes vague, and the personal factor between two populist leaders with oversized Egos – Trump and Netanyahu – could paradoxically increase the risk of skid, where cold and calculated diplomacy would be more necessary than ever. The whole region remains suspended from their moods, between strategy, rivalry and revenge.
*Sébastien Boussois is a doctor of political science, geopolitics researcher, scientific collaborator of the CNAM Paris (Defense Security team) and director of the IGE (European Geopolitical Institute).
