It is two o’clock in the morning, the night is warm and Cotonou is sleeping peacefully. Suddenly, the townspeople are roused from their torpor by assault rifle fire and the roar of armored vehicles. Leaving from the Togbin base, located in the heart of the metropolis, the conspirators sought to seize the Beninese president, Patrice Talon, and general officers of the Beninese armed forces (FAB). Led by Colonel Tigri, unit head of the special forces group, the putschists – around a hundred fighters – came from the National Guard. An elite unit created in 2020 and dedicated to the fight against terrorism. Some of them, like Colonel Tigri, are veterans of Operation Mirador, launched in 2021 in the north of the country to contain the jihadist threat coming from the Sahel.
Jeeps of hardened veterans rushing through the streets of the capital towards the presidential residence to seize the head of state and power… Here is the epinal image of the West African coup d’état. We often note the same stereotype: a coup by very well-equipped elite units which concentrate most of the operational capabilities of their army. So much so that they generally encounter little resistance from conventional units – under-administered and under-trained – and impose their unit leader at the head of the country.
A coordinated counterattack
However, on the morning of December 7, this scenario, which one might believe to be well-established, diverged in Cotonou. Instead of disbanding, or making a pact, the fighters of the Beninese Republican Guard are holding on. Defeated in the early morning, the rebels played their part and seized the television studios, where they delivered their message. Taken by storm, they finally retreated towards the Togbin base. They were cornered there by the Republican Guard and by FAB units who came to support them from neighboring bases.
Later in the day, Beninese soldiers completed their victory over the rebels, with close air support provided by the Nigerian Air Force, under ECOWAS mandate. French special forces are participating, for their part, in tracking down the fugitives. During the day, Paris also provides ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) support via an Air Force aircraft (ALSR). Combative soldiers, proactive reaction from the FAB, final support – requested, rational and controlled – from the country’s defense partners: all elements which played a role in the victory.
A depoliticized army?
According to French sources well established locally, the coup was the subject of rigorous organization. The threat was therefore very real. It is therefore difficult to interpret the management of the crisis as a simple stroke of luck in favor of the government.
Between 2022 and 2024, military budgets increased by almost 50%
Mobilized in the north and in full restructuring in the rest of the country, how did the FAB manage to nip this conspiracy in the bud? A first element of the answer could lie in the depoliticized military culture of the Beninese forces since the 1990s. At that time, the country was emerging from three decades of instability and several military coups. Constitutional reforms then explicitly aim to return control of the armies to civilians. An approach which had time to infuse over the following thirty years, also marked by a rare democratic continuity in Africa.
Another catalyst for professionalism is the participation of Beninese officers in a decade of peacekeeping operations. At the crossroads of the years 2010 and 2020, several hundred Beninese soldiers are permanently deployed outside their borders. A significant number, given the very modest strength of the FAB at that time (around 6,000 men). The various military partnerships aimed at instructing the FAB or training their officers in Western military schools undoubtedly also played a role. In short, so many factors which contributed to sedimenting the depoliticization of the Beninese military.
Changing forces
How, then, can we explain this coup attempt? Perhaps the causes should be sought in the combination of jihadist pressure in the north and subsequently the rapid – and necessary – mutation of the FAB over the last three years. As of 2021, the jihadist metastasis extends from the Sahel to northern Benin. Attacks are increasing there, taking advantage of the poor security response of the Niger and Burkina Faso states, neighbors of Benin.
The Beninese government then reacted significantly: between 2022 and 2024, military budgets increase by almost 50% and the FAB workforce doubles. At the same time, Operation Mirador was launched, mobilizing nearly 3,000 fighters in the departments of Atacora and Alibori, particularly in the WAP forest zone (W, Arlit, Pendjari) which adjoins the border.
Could this rapid growth, in a degraded security context in the north, have caused imbalances in the chain of command? And, from there, stimulate the political adventurism of certain officers? It’s a possibility. But it is clear that the Beninese army was able to manage this vulnerability on its own. Responsiveness enabled by the general increase in operational power of Beninese forces over the past ten years, both in external operations and by the modernization policy launched less than a decade ago.
From 2017, the FABs began renewing their material capabilities, with the support of their French, American, Belgian and Chinese partners: individual equipment, all-terrain armored vehicles, reconnaissance and crossing vehicles, etc. Not to mention education. This modernization has continued until today, in particular through the provision of aerial ISR assets, including drones. The current trend remains towards increasing resources and increasing skills. These include the strengthening of logistical capacities, but also the construction and modernization of several military bases and outposts.
Stability ferments
Ultimately, Benin’s image of institutional stability has not really been damaged by this affair. Completely resolved within 48 hours, the coup had no impact on institutional life. Ports and airports remained open, and economic activity was not slowed. Marginally, the putschists did not receive popular or political support, confirming the overall support of the population for its institutions. In the midst of public consolidation and growth, Benin therefore confirms its status as a reliable partner for France. An important asset to limit the extension of the Sahelian security crisis, which continues to worsen. A crisis which, let us remember, directly concerns the security of Europe’s southern borders.
