“We are going to war with France. » This official declaration from a Nigerien general went around the world on February 13. Absurd in form, this pseudo-nationalist rhetoric is in fact calculated. Objective: to divert popular attention from the collapse of the Nigerien state in the face of armed insurgent or jihadist groups. A fallacious but well-established narrative, which also targets neighboring countries like Benin.
What explains this provocation? The outburst was actually intended to give substance to the junta’s shameless lies after the attack on Niamey airport. A large-scale assault, led by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (EIGS) at the end of January. An unacceptable admission of impotence for General Tiani, leader of the junta. He therefore hastened to accuse, without any proof, France and Benin of having sponsored this attack by paying mercenaries.
We understand the embarrassment of the Nigerien junta. The legitimacy of his putsch, in July 2023, against President Mohamed Bazoum is essentially due to his initial promise to “restore order”. We remember that in August 2023, a large mobilization was organized by the putschists in the Niamey stadium. They already denounced, in front of 30,000 supporters, those “lurking in the shadows who are plotting subversion against the forward march of Niger » – hear here France and ECOWAS.
Since 2021, the number of victims of terrorism has tripled
However, that is the whole problem: since the departure of the French army, replaced by the Private Military Companies (SMP), Africa Corps (Russia) and Sadat (Turkey), a gaping security vacuum has set in, and not only in Niger.
Threat encystment
The figures from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies are edifying in this regard. Since 2021, the number of victims of terrorism has tripled. Same story with the Global Terrorism Index 2025, which shows that the three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) concentrate nearly 40% of global terrorist violence in 2024. Niger also holds the record for increase in deaths linked to terrorism between 2023 and 2024. A disaster difficult to hide from the population, hence the authoritarian escalation of the AES juntas, which have not hesitated to censor the press, muzzle the opposition and civil society, and of course to extend the duration of their “transition”.
At the same time, the indigence of the AES’s military response gives renewed freedom of action to armed groups. Their recruitment was boosted by repeated abuses – on an ethnic basis – by the security forces and their Russian auxiliaries against civilians. Can we still talk about armed groups? As data from ACLED or the International Crisis Group shows, the EIGS and GSIM control and administer entire swaths of territories, giving them proto-state influence. A situation which contrasts with their semi-clandestinity of three or four years ago. Difficult, in these conditions, to believe that separating from France, or from Minusma, was a good idea…
The “sovereignist” narrative becomes even more difficult to maintain when urban areas, once deemed impregnable, are now the target of sporadic attacks, or even temporarily fall: like the city of Djibo (Burkina Faso) in 2025. Of course, the juntas are still partially “protected” by the ethno-community basis of the conflict. De facto, large metropolises, particularly national capitals, are still beyond the operational and especially political reach of armed insurgent groups.
This difficulty probably explains the economic warfare actions that the EIGS and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM) employ against the AES states. The year 2025 saw an increase in blockades on transport and the delivery of fuel, including the Nigerien oil pipeline. Bamako felt the effects hard last fall. The objective is clear: to paralyze the economy in order to crush popular support for the juntas and thus promote their internal political fragmentation. The final bulwark of the AES today is its mercenaries, Russian or Turkish. Unable to curb the threat, they can still clear certain logistical routes and play the role of Praetorian guard.
Disinformation, a geopolitical weapon
The helping hands of jihadist groups in Bamako in 2024 or in Niamey in 2026 are therefore the icing on the cake, the spectacular epiphenomenon of the failure of the putschists. From then on, France and Benin constitute convenient diversions that the Nigerien junta offers to its very young, urban, connected and very influenceable public opinion. Since 2023, General Tiani has also denounced on several occasions – always without the slightest evidence – the financial and logistical support of France and Benin to terrorist groups operating in Niger. A very ironic accusation insofar as Porto-Novo deploys a substantial military force to defend itself from jihadist infiltrations… from Niger and Burkina Faso!
Why attack Benin, a natural partner against jihadist metastasis? The junta has never forgiven Porto-Novo for having been one of the main opponents of its putsch in 2023. So much so that, in the months that followed, General Tiani broke the defense agreements between the two countries and closed their common border. Perceived as an enemy, Benin has been the subject of attempts to destabilize information from Niamey for almost three years. Latest example: the explosion of false information, coming from pro-AES accounts, during the attempted coup against Patrice Talon, president of Benin. An informational attack crowned by a tweet-infox from the influencer Kemi Séba, special advisor to General Tiani since 2024, announcing the arrest of the Beninese president.
Fortunately, these information warfare operations have not yet translated into additional sources of instability.
The entire AES is affected. We could multiply the examples, such as the disinformation offensives coming from Mali and Burkina Faso, which target Ivory Coast and its president Alassane Ouattara: false coup d’état, false press releases, false declarations, etc. Let us also mention Mauritania, targeted this summer by Malian accounts, which spread a false rumor of a social uprising in Nouakchott, during a trip by the Mauritanian president to Washington. These countries have in common, like Benin, that they are on the front line facing the jihadist threat imported from the Sahel, and are therefore hostile to the security errors of the “Sahel States”.
An existential risk?
These actions naturally bear the mark of Russia, in the methods of action as well as in the objectives. The revanchism of the AES meets here the Russian objectives of weakening France in West Africa. The hiring of influencers Kemi Séba and Nathalie Yamb as special advisors to General Tiani is the most salient example.
Fortunately, these information warfare operations have not yet translated into additional sources of instability, despite their large audience. This is evidenced by the failure to exploit the attempted putsch in Benin.
Nevertheless, it is important to remain cautious, because the information bubble created by the AES is part of the problem. De facto, the cognitive actions of Niger and the AES, supported by their Russian, Turkish and even Italian partners, contribute to dispersing the response to the jihadist metastasis. However, the collapse – largely plausible – of Niger, Mali or Burkina Faso would plunge the entire region into the unknown. Gray area? Ethno-community fragmentation? Or the creation of a transnational jihadist state? No scenario can be ruled out. Hence the need to act against the agitators.
