French sovereignty has undoubtedly never been such a burning issue. At a time when the world is once again fragmenting into spheres of power, where major players impose their priorities, their standards and their balance of power, France, and with it Europe, appear more dependent than they imagined. In this moment of change, a question arises: what if one of the continent’s major strategic mistakes had been to have kept Russia at bay instead of integrating it into a long-term European architecture? The idea seems almost scandalous in today’s climate. However, it was part of a certain French tradition.
That of a power which did not want to be locked into a block logic. That of a diplomacy capable of thinking of the continent differently than as the simple strategic extension of Washington. That, basically, of a Gaullian intuition, that of a European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, vast enough, solid enough and sovereign enough to exist in itself. If this path had been pursued, France could have found in a long-term rapprochement with Russia much more than a simple diplomatic partnership. She would have found a lever of power there. Because the issue was not only political. It was energetic, economic, agricultural, military and civilizational.
Instead, Europe has chosen to build its security against Russia and not with it. This choice not only distanced Moscow from Brussels, it also distanced France from itself, from its tradition of independence and its capacity to pursue a unique path. Little by little, Paris found itself locked into an increasingly exclusively Atlantic architecture, where room for maneuver narrowed as dependencies increased. In the energy field, the cost of this renunciation appears with particular clarity. A structured relationship with Russia would have offered France and Europe stable, continental and competitive access to decisive resources.
Another destiny
Instead, we have replaced natural geographic complementarity with supplies that are further away, more expensive and more exposed to international crises. By claiming to gain autonomy, Europe has above all changed its dependence, and France with it. The same reasoning applies to agriculture and food security. In a world plagued by shortages, logistical tensions and the return of power, having a lasting link with one of the world’s major suppliers of cereals and fertilizers would have been a major asset. Here again, France would have had everything to gain from placing its strategy within a continental logic rather than a simple reflex of alignment.
Finally, there is the decisive question of security. A Europe including Russia would have had unique strategic depth, a first-rate army and a considerable nuclear arsenal alongside France. Paris could then have weighed in on a group less exclusively anchored to the United States, in a continental logic going from Brest to Brest-Litovsk. Not as an advanced province of the Western camp, but as one of the centers of gravity of an autonomous power. In such a framework, Ukraine would undoubtedly not have been transformed into a fault line between Russia and the West.
History cannot be rewritten. But it can be reread. And perhaps we must admit today that the refusal to integrate Russia into a long-term vision has not only deprived Europe of another destiny. It also deprived France of an essential part of itself, of its independence, its vocation for balance and its rank.
