The drone which struck the area around the Barakah nuclear power plant, near Abu Dhabi, a few days ago, marked a new major psychological and security turning point in the Gulf. The attack caused a fire on an electrical generator located near the nuclear site, without radioactive leak or lasting stoppage of operations, according to the Emirati authorities and the IAEA, the UN atomic energy agency.
For the first time since the start of the war between Israel, supported by Donald Trump, and Iran on February 28, the Emirates saw strategic nuclear infrastructure directly hit in the immediate vicinity of its capital. Behind the limited military scope of this attack, the geopolitical message is strong: the Emirates suddenly discover their structural vulnerability in a region once again dominated by traditional balance of power. The famous new Sparta that Mohammed ben Zayed dreamed of so much is now in decline.
This war acts more than ever as a revealer of the deep fractures within the Gulf and the Emirati mouse ultimately did not give birth to the geopolitical elephant so hoped for. Because behind the apparent Arab unity facing Iranan increasingly visible strategic rivalry actually pits Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against each other over how to organize the post-American regional order.
The sudden appearance of the Emirati limits
For several years, Mohammed ben Zayed has wanted to transform the Emirates into a regional, even global, hyperpower. Aggressive diplomacy, military activism, massive investments, port control, technologies, intelligence, financial influence: Abu Dhabi has gradually sought to far exceed its real weight. From Yemen to Libya, from Sudan to the Horn of Africa, the Emirates have increased direct or indirect interventions in order to become the essential player in the Middle East.
The Abraham Accords accelerated this dynamic. The Emirates have become the main Arab partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and American Trumpist networks in the region. The objective was clear: to build a new anti-Iranian regional axis largely detached from the Palestinian question and based on technology, security, intelligence and economic interests.
But this strategy is now showing its limits. According to several reports relayed in recent days, Mohammed ben Zayed even tried in vain to convince Riyadh and Doha to coordinate a joint military response against Iran after the attacks against the Gulf. The Saudi and Qatari leaders would have refused to follow this totally counterproductive logic of direct escalation to get out of the rut. This refusal perfectly illustrates the growing strategic gap between Abu Dhabi and its neighbors.
For a long time, the Emirates probably interpreted Saudi caution as a form of weakness or hesitation. Riyadh actually observed Abu Dhabi’s permanent activism with suspicion without wanting to transform each divergence into open confrontation. Yemen had already provided an early warning when UAE-backed separatists began encroaching on areas considered vital by Riyadh.
The current war is a reminder of a reality that is more present than ever: behind the skyscrapers of Dubai, the financial hubs and technological partnerships, the Emirates remains a small, extremely exposed state. Their power rests on the fluidity of globalization, regional stability and the openness of trade flows. It is a Sparta provided that everything is stable in the region, but this will be less and less the case. But when the missiles fall and critical infrastructure becomes prime targets in the Emirati confederation, the classic fundamentals of power reappear very quickly: territorial extent, strategic depth, demographic weight, logistical resilience and shock absorption capacity. And on all these counts, Riyadh remains well ahead.
Riyadh regains control of the regional game
The current war suddenly puts Saudi Arabia back at the center of the regional game. The spectacular departure of the Emirates from OPEC provided a revealing demonstration: the markets barely reacted. A few hours of tension, then a return to calm. For what ? Because energy players know perfectly well where the real global oil center of gravity remains: in Saudi Arabia.
This crisis in the Strait of Hormuz also served as a reminder of the extreme vulnerability of small Gulf states. The Emirates depends almost entirely on global trade, maritime routes, international investment, tourism and financial flows. As soon as energy corridors are threatened, this structural fragility immediately reappears.
On the contrary, Saudi Arabia has assets that no other regional player can really reproduce: strategic access to the Red Sea, East-West oil pipelines, territorial depth, gigantic energy reserves, demographic mass and considerable logistical capacities. Riyadh now appears to be the true security backbone of the Gulf in the face of regional chaos.
This war therefore acts as a geopolitical lesson. For years, many wanted to believe that finance, networks, technologies and “smart” ports could replace the historical fundamentals of power. But when drones strike refineries, ports or even a nuclear power plant, geography and strategic depth immediately take over. Barakah’s drone constitutes precisely this stark reminder. It shows that no amount of technological sophistication can fully protect an economic model dependent on permanent regional stability.
The alliance with Israel has become a strategic trap
This reality also explains why Riyadh today takes a much more cautious stance towards Israel than the Emirates. Mohammed bin Salman perfectly understood that Benjamin Netanyahu had never really envisaged the creation of a viable Palestinian state. After Gaza, any open normalization with Israel has become politically explosive in the Arab world and therefore impossible.
Saudi leaders know that completely ignoring the Palestinian issue would undermine their own credibility in the Muslim world. The Emirates, on the contrary, continued their strategic alignment with Israel and American Trumpist networks, believing they could redesign the regional order around a technological, security and anti-Iranian alliance. But this Israeli-Emirati bet is now showing its limits. The current war is a reminder that no sustainable regional architecture can completely circumvent the Palestinian question or impose an artificial polarization between an Israel-UAE axis and the rest of the Arab world.
It is precisely in this context that we must understand the recent rapprochement between Doha and Riyadh. After years of tensions, Qatar and Saudi Arabia now seem to share the same strategic vision: to prevent the Gulf from falling completely into a logic of permanent confrontation dictated by the Israel-Abu Dhabi axis. Qatar maintains open channels with many regional actors, including Iran and some Palestinian movements. Riyadh seeks above all to avoid an uncontrollable regional explosion likely to compromise its internal economic transformation. Together, Doha and Riyadh now appear as an axis of stabilization seeking to counterbalance Emirati geopolitical activism which has long become limitless. Behind this growing rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi lies a much deeper question: which model of power will dominate the post-American Middle East?
*Sébastien Boussois is a doctor in political science, media consultant, researcher in international relations associated with the CNAM Paris (Defense Security Team) and the Geostrategic Observatory of Geneva (Switzerland) and director of the European Geopolitical Institute (IGE).
