For a week, the crisis triggered by Israeli and American strikes and the military escalation that followed has plunged the Islamic Republic into a paradoxical situation: more aggressive than ever, but also more isolated than it has been in decades. Iranian retaliation against several installations in the Gulf countries caused a regional shock wave, gradually transforming a bilateral confrontation with Israel into a broader crisis affecting global geopolitical and energy balances.
In this risk of conflagration, a curious silence: that of two powers that Iran has long presented as its strategic partners, Russia and China. Neither visible military support, nor major diplomatic engagement, nor even a strong political protection posture. A Syrian scenario where Bashar Al Assad was released before joining Moscow. An attitude that poses a simple question: is Iran discovering the limits of its alliances? It is an opportunity for the Westerners who ventured into this risky conflict with disastrous consequences.
The accelerated isolation of Iran in the Middle East
The strikes and counter-strikes of recent days have highlighted a strategic reality that Tehran sought to avoid: its regional network of proxies is no longer enough to compensate for its isolation even if the regime is fighting more violently than Trump and Netanyahu could have imagined. By targeting sensitive infrastructure in the Gulf and causing disruptions in energy flows with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran took the risk of alienating not only its traditional adversaries, but also actors who, until now, tried to maintain a fragile balance. He creates a game of dominoes that endangers the entire already fragile architecture of the Middle East.
This moment of extreme tension accelerates a dynamic already at work for several years
The Gulf monarchies, long cautious towards Tehran, now see Iran as a direct factor in energy and security instability. The United Arab Emirates are paying for their alliance with Washington and Tel Aviv. Even countries which maintained channels of dialogue, such as Qatar or Oman, have been hit and find themselves placed in a delicate position while preparing for the future. Because we will have to discuss again.
This moment of extreme tension accelerates a dynamic that has already been at work for several years: the progressive marginalization of Iran in the regional system. Between economic sanctions, internal protests and loss of influence of certain relays such as Hezbollah or regional militias from Iraq to Yemen, Tehran today appears more vulnerable than it is willing to admit. In this context, Iran is fighting like hell alone. Did he really think he could count on his Eurasian partners to compensate for this unprecedented pressure on his regime? But this is precisely where the situation becomes more ambiguous.
An old relationship with Moscow and Beijing
For two decades, Iran has built a strategic rapprochement with Russia and China, based on a common interest: to challenge Western hegemony and promote a multipolar world. On paper, this axis seemed solid, especially with its network of proxies. In recent years, Russia has strengthened its military cooperation with Tehran, particularly in the field of drones and military equipment. China, for its part, has become Iran’s main trading partner and its main buyer of oil, despite Western sanctions.
For China as for Russia, Iran has never been an ally in the classic sense of the term
The strategic partnership signed between Beijing and Tehran in 2021, supposed to structure twenty-five years of economic and energy cooperation, was presented as a historic turning point for Iranian-Chinese friendship. As for Moscow, the war in Ukraine has brought the two regimes closer together in a logic of solidarity between sanctioned powers but this does not go any further as Moscow is already scrapping in Ukraine and hoping to take advantage of the fact that all eyes are on the Middle East to redouble its intensity against kyiv.
But these relations have always been based on pragmatic rather than ideological logic. What do these three countries really share apart from their anti-Westernism? For China as for Russia, Iran has never been an ally in the classic sense of the term. He is a useful partner, sometimes indispensable, but not irreplaceable. Like the diet of Bashar al-Assad. Now that Alawite Syria has fallen, a commitment to the last major regional partner seems even more surreal. And it is precisely this transactional logic that explains the extreme caution of Moscow and Beijing today.
A strategic silence
Faced with the current escalation, neither Russia nor China seem ready to get massively and truly involved in defending Iran. Both would provide information to Tehran but it is difficult to know more at this stage. Moscow, absorbed by the war in Ukraine and anxious not to open a new diplomatic front with the West, is content with general calls for de-escalation. China is also adopting an even more cautious posture. Beijing depends massively on the stability of Gulf energy routes and global maritime trade for its famous Silk Roads. Any lasting disruption in the region poses a direct threat to its economic model.
This is why the prospect of a lasting blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, or even a simple lasting disruption of energy traffic, represents a scenario that Beijing absolutely wants to avoid. For China, wars are always bad business. They disrupt supply chains, drive up energy prices and weaken markets. In other words, Iran could be a useful partner to circumvent American influence as long as it was not threatened, but it must never become a factor of global instability. If Tehran crossed this line by permanently threatening energy trade, Chinese patience could quickly reach its limits.
This economic logic also parallels, in a paradoxical way, that which we observe in Washington. Donald Trump, despite his confrontational rhetoric with Iran, has always shown a deep reluctance to engage in long and costly wars. For a week, he has been praying for the war to last as short as possible. But things seem to be going rather poorly at the moment.
*Sébastien Boussois is a doctor in political science, media consultant, researcher in international relations associated with the CNAM Paris (Defense Security Team) and the Geostrategic Observatory of Geneva (Switzerland) and director of the European Geopolitical Institute (IGE).
