Even if the war in Iran is not formally over, it is possible to draw some lessons from this unprecedented conflict. First lesson: a mixed defeat for the United States. President Trump was undoubtedly thinking, in February, after the success obtained in Venezuela, of starting a military walk – just as Putin had believed and said the same thing in 2022 in Ukraine. However, the United States has not learned any of the lessons from its previous military adventures, in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Middle East is not the American continent; it is not the Western world with its forms of rationality.
Even more, Iran, which is said to have been weakened by forty years of embargo, resisted in an astonishing manner, because this embargo had generated a desire for military organization and preparation for war, a desire that had been strengthened for thirty years. The United States achieved neither the fall of the mullahs (which was one of the objectives), nor the collapse of the regime, nor the liberation of the Iranian people, and even less the restoration of the Shah. They are far from obtaining a nuclear agreement better than that of 2015, which Donald Trump recklessly and quickly denounced. On the other hand, they obtained the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which conditions the world economy.
It is also probably the temporary putting on hold of the Abraham Accords. Israel, which has been an implicit ally of the moderate Gulf monarchies since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, is once again becoming the country through which problems arrive. Netanyahu has become inaccessible. It is therefore – and this is undoubtedly a conclusion full of uncertainties – a reconfiguration of the Middle East that must be considered.
Inverted balance of power
Second lesson, which relates not to concrete results (or the absence of results, we should say), but to the image or symbol. The image is that of American planes shot down by Iranian drones, of a Donald Trump who repeats every day that Iran is on its knees, that he is begging the United States to reach an agreement. It is also the image of American weapons damaged and incapable of making the Iranian regime listen to reason.
Iran has demonstrated resilience or resistance that we did not suspect
The symbol is that of a country, the United States, formerly a “hyperpower” in the words of former minister Hubert Védrine, which is no longer as invincible as we thought. Already challenged by its desire to abandon its European allies, to abandon NATO founded by a former American president, the country appears to be overwhelmed because it is entangled in a recklessly launched conflict. The Gulf monarchies which do not want a head-to-head with Iran and which depend on the stability of the hydrocarbon market, will perhaps seek support elsewhere, and not necessarily where we think: towards Turkey, Pakistan or even by strengthening their regional cooperation.
Gulf geopolitics
Third lesson: cascading consequences. At least two appear. First, the Gulf monarchies, over-armed by the United States, showed themselves incapable of defending themselves or using these weapons; they were also finally reached militarily by their Iranian neighbor. This means that the confidence of the Gulf States in the American military umbrella risks being greatly reduced. Same cause as in Europe with NATO, same results.
Then, it is the attitude, until now neutral or benevolent, of the great powers, Russia and especially China, which observe the world’s leading economic and military power mired in the Gulf and an American president who has only one desire: to get out of this quagmire “at all costs” or “whatever it costs”. What if this war gave ideas to a Chinese president regarding Taiwan? Would Washington intervene?
Fourth and final lesson: Iran has demonstrated resilience or resistance that we did not suspect. The regime emerges from this conflict undoubtedly strengthened; above all, its determination to acquire nuclear weapons will probably be strengthened. The United States is not attacking North Korea, which most certainly has nuclear weapons. Iran has every interest in following this example: neither Israel, nor Washington, and even less Europe, will engage in an armed conflict with Iran in the future. Finally, this war in some way rehabilitates the theory of “the weak to the strong”: Sparta against Athens, David against Goliath, Charles VII against the English… Iran will now be a major power with which it will have to be reckoned. All in all, this short war produces considerable chain effects for the balance of the Middle East and that of the world. Ukraine had already brought its share of surprises, the Gulf continues in this direction.
*Xavier Driencourt is the former French ambassador to Algeria.
