Now that the American mid-term elections have passed and that Congress will swing largely back to the Democratic side, we must not forget that it will remain the same until January 3 before its renewal following the vote. In the meantime, and faithful to his obsessions, Donald Trump has promised a settlement of the Iranian issue, one blow by force, one blow by diplomacy. But this time, he seems more determined than ever to once again favor the military option. For the moment, it is not necessarily the major electoral setback that he has just suffered that will stop him.
The Tehran regime, despite the targeted eliminations of its leaders, despite the violent strikes, despite the deaths, despite the internal protests of the youth, seems more established than ever. Certainly, it suffered heavy damage during these eight months of war, but its proxies are still active. They regularly sow chaos, from Gaza to Lebanon via Iraq. From now on, the Houthis even control the circulation of hydrocarbons in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and strike Saudi Arabia in the heart. A simple military reading to continue the war started on February 28 by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu is no longer enough to envisage the political aftermath. The Islamic Republic, contrary to what the American president had dreamed of, did not fall in a few days, and we will have to deal with it. The permanent disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, the Revolutionary Guards’ greatest war trophy, is costly to the petromonarchies and the West.
Now, what does Donald Trump want, or rather what can he do, increasingly alone, if Netanyahu does not return to the post of Prime Minister after the government negotiations and his rival Gadi Eisenkot finally takes control of the Arab parties? These next few days will be decisive. In Doha, Qatar, negotiations are accelerating between the American and Iranian delegations to find an agreement as quickly as possible before a new deluge of bombs falls on Iran. But does Trump want to win the peace or settle scores?
During the 2024 presidential campaign, the MAGA candidate was clearly committed to the end of all endless conflicts. He was therefore reluctant to trigger a new one. But he did it because, at the time, too sure of himself, or poorly advised or influenced, he was certain that a blitzkrieg would overcome the Islamic Republic. This was, unfortunately, a very poor understanding of Iran, which has no shortage of resources since it has been skilfully preparing for a foreign attack. That is to say for 48 years. Trump should have understood, beyond a certain pride and surely disappointed with the real pressure and threat capabilities of the leading world power faced with a global South increasingly resistant and rebellious to the Western order, that continuing the war would change nothing. Certainly, the day after the American elections and in a more difficult position, the temptation of a new offensive against Tehran comes up against a reality: eight months of war have not overthrown the regime, and the world economy is above all waiting for the reopening of Hormuz.
Eight months of war, and after?
We have clearly been under the illusion of a definitive and total military victory over Iran for too long. Many of course dreamed of it last February, starting with the diaspora in exile, who are just waiting to return to the country. Favoring the diplomatic solution, the one which has the greatest chance of succeeding a priori, also means endorsing and legitimizing the person with whom we are discussing, and somehow no longer wishing for their departure. Trump therefore negotiates with those he seeks to eliminate at the same time. Can we negotiate with Tehran? It is an open question, difficult to decide, as much on the ballistic program as on nuclear or on the repression of students and the capital executions, since last year, of all those who dared to challenge the power. So why massively resume bombing against Iran when, since February, American and Israeli military power has failed to bring about the collapse of the regime?
Hormuz deal could allow Trump to claim global economic success, without needing to topple Iranian regime
You don’t have to be a great cleric to see that the Iranian regime has survived, that it has somehow strengthened itself ideologically, with its military success, its resistance, the cult of Shiite death, its engineers which we are cruelly lacking in our post-industrial Western societies. Then, a new offensive does not guarantee the disappearance of the Republic. Moreover, and this is often a contested argument because it would give credit to the mullahs and the Pasdarans and therefore make democratic change impossible, a brutal fall could lead to a breakup of the State, or even a civil war. Finally, the repetition of strikes risks maintaining a logic of revenge rather than producing a political solution. It’s the endless cycle.
And the world economy is waiting for it more than the overthrow of the Iranian regime. First, the closure of the strait affects not only the Gulf countries, but also the European and Asian economies, energy markets, logistics chains and, indirectly, American consumers for eight months. And Trump paid for it a little in the elections that just took place. It’s the best he could do at first.
Then, Qatar appears to be an essential diplomatic actor. Recent discussions in Doha focused on a progressive de-escalation mechanism, notably combining the lifting of certain American restrictions and the reopening of Hormuz. Disagreements remain significant, but there is a concrete diplomatic path. Finally, a deal on Hormuz could allow Trump to claim global economic success, without needing to overthrow the Iranian regime. This would not resolve all nuclear and security issues, but would constitute a first tangible result, because it has been lacking for months and months.
At the end of the legislative elections on September 27 in Israel, Netanyahu won first place with Likud, but does not have a majority. His bloc totals 53 seats out of 120, that of Gadi Eisenkot 48, while the Arab parties have 19 seats and can influence the formation of the government. Eisenkot is therefore not yet Prime Minister, but his accession to power constitutes a serious hypothesis. From now on, we must consider three future situations on the Iranian issue. If Netanyahu remains in power, he could continue to put pressure on Trump to resume the offensive, and that is making the American president itchy. But the increased reluctance of Congress, ultimately and beyond the two months of installation of the new assemblies, could block the vote of new budgets for the war. But for two months, and with the old 2024 version of Congress, he still has his hands free until January 3.
If Eisenkot becomes prime minister, Trump could have someone less personally committed to the immediate prosecution of the war. Be careful, however: a former chief of staff, Eisenkot still remains a supporter of a firm policy towards Iran. He could nevertheless more easily accept a solution negotiated under American aegis. A Bibi-Eisenkot national unity government, however, would complicate a clear decision: Should Israel follow the United States again? And for what? Who or what to target? For what expected results? If Israel remains in political stalemate for the next two months, Trump may choose to wait rather than launch a major new operation in the middle of coalition negotiations. But Netanyahu could also see this period of uncertainty as an opportunity to accelerate events. We must also seriously consider Bibi’s departure and its repercussions on the American president: a Trump upset by the departure of his ally could want to demonstrate that he remains, independently of Israeli internal politics, the only true master of the regional military calendar.
By wanting to win all the wars (he spoke of 7 conflicts resolved at this same time of year in 2025), Donald Trump risks missing the only victory that the world truly needs today: reopening Hormuz, stabilizing the energy markets and giving diplomacy back a place that it should never have lost. Overthrow the mullahs? It would still be necessary to explain why eight months of war did not achieve this. Save Netanyahu? Yes, but do the Israelis still want him and “his” war? And above all, at what point should the interests of the global economy stop taking precedence over the political calculations of two men, certainly faced with a real regional and global threat?
*Sébastien Boussois is a doctor in political science, media consultant, researcher in international relations associated with the CNAM Paris (Defense Security Team) and the Geostrategic Observatory of Geneva (Switzerland) and director of the European Geopolitical Institute (IGE).
