On October 26, Moscow announced with great fanfare the successful final test of the nuclear-powered cruise missile “Bourevestnik”, officially capable of defeating almost all interception systems. A few days later, in response, Donald Trump stunned the world by announcing his desire to see the United States resume its nuclear tests.
Has the nuclear arms race been relaunched? One thing is certain: in 2024-2025, the nine nuclear powers (United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) have collectively increased their nuclear spending by 11% in one year. We thought that the mad headlong rush towards atomic weapons was a bad memory of the Cold War. Here the terrible prospect begins again, in an even more unstable and multipolar world.
How to defuse the situation?
For more than ten years, I participated in negotiations between Washington and Moscow. A certainty emerged: arms control has never been based on trust, but on the recognition that security requires predictability and shared rules. It was precisely because the two superpowers saw themselves as irreconcilable adversaries that they agreed to limit their arsenals. This cold realism has avoided the worst for decades.
In Washington, the idea has taken hold since 1991 that a weakened Russia was no longer a strategic actor of the same rank.
However, this architecture, patiently built since the 1960s, is falling apart. It has gone out of fashion. The American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, then the end of the INF Treaty, the denunciation of the “Open Skies” treaty, and in 2023 the suspension by Moscow of New Start, the last agreement still standing and which will expire in 2026. Without a new initiative, there will no longer be any framework to limit or monitor the arsenals of the two central powers.
A return to the 1950s, marked by opacity and the risk of potentially catastrophic errors of interpretation. On the Doomsday Clock, we have never been this close to midnight.
No need to rely on mutual trust
Why this disintegration? In Washington, the idea has taken hold since 1991 that a weakened Russia was no longer a strategic actor of the same rank. A poor interpretation of reality: if the USSR is no more, the Russian Federation retains nearly 6,000 atomic weapons in its arsenals. Sooner or later, the question of disarmament and the fight against proliferation should arise again. Here we are.
As the economist Jeffrey Sachs rightly pointed out, America’s unilateral withdrawals have not strengthened their security. They weakened it by removing essential safeguards. They also feed the image of a “nuclear exceptionalism”which weakens American credibility in matters of non-proliferation.
Some call for building a multipolar framework including China or India. The objective is legitimate, but it is vain to want to build it by destroying what still exists. The logical order consists of preserving what can be preserved, reestablishing a minimum of dialogue between Moscow and Washington, then gradually expanding this base.
Without an American-Russian foundation, no global architecture will be able to emerge
We repeat that trust has disappeared. However, it was never the condition for arms control: what made the negotiations possible was the shared awareness of the danger and the cost of a race without rules. We must become aware of it.
We are at a critical moment. Breaking with the legacy of arms control, under the pretext that it is outdated, would be a major strategic mistake. Experience shows that nations accept limitations only when they understand that the absence of rules exposes them more. This reasoning remains true. It is urgent that current leaders reconnect with this realism.
*Former ambassador, Ednan Agaev held leading positions in the Soviet, then Russian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as at the United Nations. From 1982 to 1994, he led bilateral negotiations with Washington on the limitation of nuclear weapons. Based in Paris, he is now an international business consultant.
