Since the launch of strikes between Iran, Israel and the United States, one thing has become obvious: France comments on the crises in the Middle East more than it influences them. Emmanuel Macron’s speech on March 3 attempted to reaffirm the existence of a French “third way”, faithful to the diplomatic tradition of balance that Paris has claimed for decades. But behind this familiar posture hides a much less flattering reality: France is now struggling to influence the decisions which structure the major strategic balances of the region.
The very fact that the American military operation was launched without real consultation with France, or even with Europe, constitutes a revealing signal. For a country which claims a central place in international affairs and which readily presents itself as a global diplomatic power, being kept away from such a strategic moment is less of an awkwardness than a symptom. That of a progressive downgrading.
The end of the referee’s illusion
Since General de Gaulle, France has cultivated the image of a power capable of dialogue with all actors in the Middle East. This tradition has long nourished the idea that Paris could embody a form of balance between the blocs, an “honest broker” capable of maintaining open channels with rival powers.
But this role of arbiter presupposes two conditions: being respected by the protagonists and having real levers of influence. But these two conditions are eroding. In the current crisis, French diplomacy is attempting a middle line: condemning certain strikes deemed contrary to international law while designating Iran as a central factor in regional destabilization. This position aims to preserve a form of diplomatic balance. Above all, it reveals an increasing difficulty in assuming a clear strategic positioning.
France may be drawn into a regional confrontation over which it controls neither the objectives nor the timetable
While Paris seeks the right diplomatic distance, the structuring decisions are taken elsewhere. In Washington, where the military red lines are drawn. In Tel Aviv, where Israeli security logic is at play. But also in the capitals of the Gulf, which have become essential diplomatic players. In this new strategic landscape, France appears more and more as a supporting power. The decline of French influence in the Sahel, the gradual erasure in the Syrian issue or the chronic difficulties weighing on the Lebanese scene have gradually weakened Paris’ regional credibility. What was once a structuring presence now becomes one presence among others.
The alliance trap
The current crisis also reveals a strategic paradox: France can be drawn into a regional confrontation over which it controls neither the objectives nor the timetable. The defense agreements concluded with the United Arab Emirates are the most direct illustration of this. The drone attack which targeted the French base in Abu Dhabi on March 1 is a reminder that the French military presence in the region can now become a target in a conflict that goes beyond it.
The deployment of Rafale to protect Emirati airspace de facto transforms France into an indirect actor in the conflict. Officially defensive, this posture nevertheless places us in a regional dynamic shaped by other powers. However, the Gulf States are pursuing strategic agendas which do not always coincide with European priorities. By finding itself mechanically involved in these rivalries, France exposes itself to political, security and economic risks which do not necessarily correspond to its fundamental interests.
Dispersed power
Faced with rising tensions, Paris is trying to display its capacity for action. The deployment of the Charles-de-Gaulle aircraft carrier and discussions on an expanded European nuclear deterrent aim to remind us that France remains a major military power. But these signals of power are no longer enough to mask a more structural difficulty: that of strategic coherence. By wanting to be present on all fronts – from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific, from the Sahel to the Gulf – France risks diluting its resources and its influence. This dispersion fuels a growing contradiction between the scale of the ambitions displayed and the reality of the capacities that can be mobilized.
In a world that has suddenly become multipolar again, the powers that count are those which concentrate their resources on clear priorities. Conversely, powers which multiply commitments without prioritizing their interests risk exhausting themselves in apparent diplomacy.
The realism test
In this context, even the upcoming succession of the UN Secretary General illustrates France’s limited room for maneuver. This type of diplomatic deadline remains one of the rare spaces where Paris can still exert influence. But here too, international competition is intensifying and the balance is changing rapidly. The reality is therefore simpler than we would like to admit: France remains a respected power, but it is no longer a structuring power in major international crises.
If Paris wants to avoid a lasting downgrade, it will have to abandon certain illusions. The first consists of believing that France can still arbitrate alone regional balances shaped by much more committed powers. The second is to think that principled diplomacy can be enough in a world dominated by power logic.
The Middle East is a brutal reminder of a simple rule of geopolitics: in major crises, only the powers capable of imposing or blocking decisions count. Today, France is no longer in this category. And as long as this observation is not lucidly accepted, French foreign policy will remain prisoner of a mirage: that of a power that the world continues to respect, but which it consults less and less.
*Frédéric Roussey is an international advisor, he has supported political and diplomatic action at the highest level for many years. A former independent journalist, he has covered numerous geopolitical areas around the world.
