The Tangwall Campagin. Could the US-Israeli war on Iran escalate into a wider conflict?
Alain Bauer. It is indeed a conflict in stages whose elements of extension or expansion have been analyzed at length since the so-called “twelve days” war waged in June 2025. The conflict pitted Israel and its American ally against Iran and its proxies (Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, Yemeni Houthis), and was interrupted at the request of President Trump, who had opened up space for negotiation.
Now the conflict has spread to all countries of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Emirates, Oman, Qatar), Lebanon, international waters near Sri Lanka, Cyprus and up to Turkish airspace. If air defenses, particularly Emirati ones, seem to be holding up well, Iranian attacks against military bases have extended to refining or oil exploitation centers in Saudi Arabia, and gas centers in Qatar. The conflict is therefore both military and economic.
Trump’s war goals and Netanyahu are they identical?
Initially, the logic of disarmament of Iran desired by the United States and that of collapse of the regime desired by Israel follow parallel and coherent paths. The destruction of military devices, the Revolutionary Guards and the regime’s infrastructure is perfectly coordinated and must result in a sufficient weakening to obtain the partial disarmament of Iran (missiles and drones) and the restitution or dilution of its stocks of highly enriched uranium. Beyond that, there is a divergence between the American posture – which would like a Venezuelan-style solution by avoiding the chaos of a disintegration of the country – and that desired by Israel, which wishes the disappearance of the regime and a profound revolution – at the risk of chaos but on a model which would also rely on the national minorities present (Azeris and Kurds, in particular).
Is regime change possible in the absence of a large-scale ground operation?
Contrary to popular belief, the question is less that of a heavy land operation – excluding special forces missions on essential objectives – than the capacity to generate local support which can make it possible, in addition to naval air operations, to overthrow a regime. An invasion is not essential if there is a powerful internal opposition, if possible armed.
“China cannot afford to lose Iranian oil”
The Vietnamese, Afghan or Iraqi precedents remain very sensitive to the United States and land options seem relegated to the bottom of the list, without being completely prohibited. Revenge for the humiliation suffered in 1979 during the American embassy hostage affair in Tehran may upset the usual precautions.
Has Trump become a “hawk”?
Donald Trump often acts much more rationally than we think. It has a relatively coherent long-term strategy and very flexible tactical choices, which can also be viewed live, with a packaging of its positions which aims to reconcile at the same time the isolationists and the supporters of revenge, the supporters of“America First” and pro-Israelis. This crest line is complex to maintain and his administration’s communication is sometimes muddled, as it is difficult to adapt to changes in the American president’s positions. He still has a narrow majority in his Maga electorate, but this will crumble or collapse depending on American losses during the current conflict. But opinion is fickle and Donald Trump’s mastery of political reality TV still leaves him significant room for maneuver.
Can China and Russia, Iran’s strategic partners, have any influence in this conflict?
Russia is out of the game. India watches from afar. Turkey, which is trying to reinvent the Ottoman Empire, has not yet really taken a position. Only China, an imperial power that is reasserting itself and remilitarizing itself, emphasizes its presence at the same time – a flotilla is directly present in the Gulf, including on its most powerful intelligence vessel, the Liaowang-1 – and its support by rearming Iran and providing it with fuel for its missiles, anti-aircraft assets, radar equipment and intelligence. China, equal to the United States in modern military means, notably in drones, has gone from cautious spectator to determined actor, while avoiding directly engaging in the conflict. Despite its immense investments in nuclear and alternative energy, it cannot afford to lose both Venezuela and Iran as oil suppliers.
And the Europeans in all this? Are they marginalized?
Europe is a market, not a power. It is ignored, divided, therefore marginalized. Only France, due to its fairly restrictive agreements with the Emirates (especially Abu Dhabi), would be able, or even obliged, to intervene. The strange joint Franco-German-British statement indicating a desire to strike Iranian missiles “at the source” left doubt surrounding an operation in Iranian territory. The British quickly backpedaled, emphasizing that they would only provide access to their bases. The Germans did not specify anything. The French posture remains unclear, even if the Emirates’ defense could push to go beyond the simple interception of missiles in flight.
What consequences will this conflict have on international trade? The blocking of Strait of Hormuz can it last forever?
The current blockage is due more to the extreme caution of shipowners and insurers than to the Iranian capacity to block it. The heavy Iranian fleet is largely destroyed, there remain dozens of small vessels, speedboats in particular, capable of kamikaze operations, and especially drones which can strike ships and cause traffic disruption. The organization of columns of oil tankers, LNG tankers and container ships, based on a model already known during the Second World War or against piracy, could partially solve the problem. But the narrowness of the strait and the possibility of a slowdown in trade, while between two thirds and all of the hydrocarbon exports of the Gulf monarchies pass through it, probably constitute the main risk of the conflict.
Can the destabilization of the Middle East have consequences for the internal security of European countries?
Iran has never hidden its capabilities for the direct or indirect use of terrorism, including through the recruitment of criminal operators or “hired terrorists”, often very young and capable of operations of disruption or manipulation, targeted attacks or mass terrorism. This risk is very serious and widely taken into account by public authorities throughout Europe and the United States.
